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1 Introduction
Meat has been part of the diet of most human societies (Stanford and Bunn,
2001; Burgat, 2017), and is still omnipresent in human culture (e.g., in holiday
meals). Yet, the consumption of meat requires animals to be raised and killed
and can be viewed as a morally problematic activity. Most people are emotionally
disturbed when made aware of the suffering of animals associated with modern
industrial farming practices (Plous, 1993). Individuals who care about the well-
being of animals face a trade-off in their consumption choice between the utility
derived from eating meat and the psychological disutility implied by their awareness
of the suffering inflicted on farm animals.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between individu-
als’ consumption of meat and their perception of the well-being of animals raised
for consumption. We introduce a behavioral model of demand for meat in which
individuals form self-serving beliefs to reduce the guilt associated with the negative
externalities inflicted on animals. This model enables us to make predictions on the
link between consumers’ preferences and beliefs, as well as on consumers’ reaction
to exogenous parameters, such as the price of meat.
Exploring the determinants of meat consumption is important for several rea-
sons. First, the meat industry represents a significant fraction of our economic
activity; in the US, it accounts for about 6% of the US GDP, including direct and
indirect revenues (see NAMI, 2013). However, the future of the sector is in question
due to the increasing proportion of vegetarians in the population and the grow-
ing awareness of the negative impacts of meat consumption (The Economist, 2018).
Among the different reasons commonly proposed to reduce meat consumption, such
as environmental externalities, or negative effects on consumers’ health, the moral
dimension plays an important role (Ruby, 2012). Increasingly, animal rights orga-
nizations provide consumers with information about the harsh living conditions of
animals in the farming industry, and animal sciences demonstrate animals’ capacity
to suffer physically and emotionally (Low et al., 2012; Ritvo, 2007). If innovations
such as plant-based proteins or cultured meat become an affordable substitute for
meat in the future, consumers will have to choose between “meat” produced with
or without the use of animals. The moral dimension could then be one of the chief
determinants of this choice.
Second, meat consumption concerns the daily choices of billions of individuals. It
thus offers an important application of a recent literature in psychology and behav-
ioral economics that studies individuals’ behavior in situations of moral dilemmata.
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This literature, reviewed in Section 2, documents that individuals have a tendency
to form self-serving beliefs that understate the negative consequences of their ac-
tions on others. In the case of meat consumption, this behavioral phenomenon has
recently received some attention in psychology, as a potential explanation for the
“meat paradox” (Loughnan et al., 2010).
We develop a model of demand for meat inspired by the literature on motivated
reasoning. According to this explanation, individuals deny objective information
regarding the living conditions of animals in order to alleviate the feeling of guilt
that they experience when they consume meat. The amount of meat consumed by
an individual thus has a causal effect on their perception of animal welfare.
Our model works as follows. An individual selects a quantity of meat for con-
sumption at a unit price p. Consuming a quantity c of meat delivers some utility
U(c), but inflicts a moral cost ωxc to the agent: ω is the extent to which the indi-
vidual feels empathetic towards animals and internalizes their suffering, or to which
the individual feels guilty about her consumption, whereas x measures the perceived
intensity of the externality inflicted on animals as a result of meat consumption.
The variable x is uncertain ex ante, and encompasses all the parameters pertaining
to the perception of the consequences of meat consumption: whether animals are
able to feel physical and emotional pain, how much livestock suffer from farming
practices, the extent to which consuming meat is necessary for good health, etc.
The core of the model, in line with micro-level evidence on information processing
in situations of moral dilemmata, is that individuals do not care about the “true”
value of x but only about their perception of it. As a result, they have incentives to
manipulate their own expectation of x in order to keep consuming large quantities
of meat without feeling too guilty about it.
We model information processing as an intra-personal game, adapting the archi-
tecture of the model of motivated beliefs provided by Be´nabou and Tirole (2002).1
The consumer has two selves. Self 0 receives some information about the true value
of x, and decides either to transmit the information to Self 1, or to conceal it, at
some cost of self-deception. Self 0 only cares about Self 1’s perception of x and
thus has an incentive to manipulate information transmission. We focus on Self
0’s choice of whether to transmit or conceal bad news, i.e. signals that indicate a
large externality and therefore prescribe a low consumption of meat. In equilibrium,
individuals who decide to engage in self-deception are biased in their perception of
the externality imposed on animals, and form different beliefs from those of realistic
1See also Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), Be´nabou and Tirole (2011), Be´nabou (2013), Levy (2014),
and Le Yaouanq (2018) for applications of this model.
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individuals, even though all agents have received the same piece of information in
the first place.
The model makes the following predictions. First, there is a negative association
between individuals’ subjective expectation of x and their consumption of meat.
This result is due to the fact that individuals with a larger taste for meat are more
likely to engage in self-deception, since the marginal benefit of denying the moral
externality is the largest for these individuals. In turn, these optimistic beliefs
increase demand for meat relative to their realistic peers. Individuals who consume
a large quantity in equilibrium are therefore likely to understate the suffering of
animals, whereas individuals who consume small quantities have little incentives to
form distorted beliefs.
Second, consumers become more realistic when the price of meat increases. In-
tuitively, an increase in the price of meat makes consumption less appealing, and
therefore the incentives to deny the negative consequences of consumption also
shrink. The model therefore predicts that variations in prices, an exogenous pa-
rameter, influence individuals’ perception of animal welfare. This contrasts with
the standard theory of belief formation, in which variations in prices do not have
any effect on consumers’ beliefs.2
Third, we investigate how consumers react to variations in the cost of guilt ω.
This comparative statics result is useful for predicting which consumers are the most
likely to form distorted beliefs, or for predicting the effect of an external increase in
the social stigma borne by meat eaters (for instance, following advertising campaigns
by animal rights activists). Perhaps surprisingly, we show that an increase in ω
does not necessarily make the consumer more realistic: this intuition holds true
if and only if the consumer’s demand for meat is sufficiently elastic. A consumer
with an elastic demand can easily adapt to changes in ω by reducing consumption,
which therefore lowers the need to engage in self-deception. In contrast, a consumer
whose demand is inelastic will ultimately decide to maintain a high consumption
level following a variation in ω, and therefore feels a higher need to alleviate the
guilt generated by her consumption. Our results thus imply that the effectiveness
of campaigns designed to induce guilt is mediated by the elasticity of preferences.
Fourth, we examine the agents’ ex-ante attitude towards information. In a stan-
dard model, consumers are (weakly) better off when they receive some information
about the consequences of their actions, and they should thus be willing to acquire
information about the living conditions of livestock. Things are different if individu-
2The idea that prices influence (motivated) beliefs also appeared in Schwardmann (2019) in
the context of preventative health care.
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als form motivated beliefs, as already noticed by the literature in different contexts
(see for instance Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017;
and Golman et al., 2017 for a survey). The attitude towards information takes a
simple form in our model: individuals are information-loving if their equilibrium
strategy is to accept bad news, and information-averse if their equilibrium strategy
is to deny bad news. Intuitively, individuals who deny bad news are harmed by the
information, which does not affect their actions but forces them to engage in an
active process of self-deception.
Fifth, and finally, we examine in an extension a model in which a group of
identical individuals interact. Be´nabou (2013) demonstrated that denial can be
contagious in a setting where individuals engaged in a collective project can resort
to wishful thinking to protect their anticipatory feelings. We show that a similar
complementarity of cognitive strategies arises in our context, with a different foun-
dation. We assume that individuals’ utility is affected by the aggregate consumption
of meat in society, and not solely by the externality generated by their own consump-
tion. On top of the direct consumption externality, individuals observe the meat
consumption of others and may learn the true state of animal suffering from that
observation. We show that two symmetric equilibria can coexist, one equilibrium
featuring collective realism and one equilibrium of collective denial. Under denial,
learning opportunities are limited as others’ actions are insensitive to the true state
of the world, and externalities imposed on animals are high, making incentives to
deny bad news higher.
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the model, the
results of which are presented in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5
with a discussion of the model.
2 Related literature
In this section we provide a two-part review of the relevant literature. We
start with the evidence documenting the importance of moral aspects in meat con-
sumption, and we then proceed with the literature on motivated beliefs in moral
dilemmata produced by economists and social psychologists.
2.1 Moral consequences of meat consumption
A lot of casual evidence suggests that individuals hold empathetic feelings to-
wards animals. For instance, there exist more than 60 million domestic dogs in
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the US, and many of them are treated as family members, receiving for instance a
birthday or a Christmas present (Coate and Knight, 2010). Wild animals, too, are
regularly the center of media attention and widespread sympathy, as documented by
the recent scandal about the shooting of Cecil, the lion, which provoked responses of
reprobation and anger by scores of individuals around the globe. Francione (2004)
reports that two-thirds of Americans polled by the Associated Press agree with the
following statement: “An animal’s right to live free of suffering should be just as
important as a person’s right to live free of suffering”. Yet, every year billions of
animals are raised in industrial farming facilities for their meat. This situation illus-
trates the apparent discrepancy between individuals’ attitude towards animals and
the consequences of their daily actions. It has been the object of a recent strand of
academic research in psychology referring to “the meat paradox” (Loughnan et al.,
2010).
The importance of moral concerns in meat consumption decisions is exemplified
by the fact that omnivores and vegetarians have systematically different beliefs
about and attitudes towards animals. Vegetarians are more likely than omnivores
to admit that animals raised for food have the capacity to suffer (Bratanova et al.,
2011). Rothgerber (2014) reports a positive correlation between meat consumption
and agreement with statements such as “animals don’t really suffer when being
raised and killed for meat” and “animals do not feel pain the same way humans do”.
In their survey studies, Bilewicz et al. (2011) report that vegetarians and omnivores
attribute different emotional capacities to different animals. They find for instance
that omnivores, unlike vegetarians, draw a line between the emotions of meat versus
non-meat animals (Bilewicz et al., 2011). Many vegetarians indicate that the ethical
dimension is a key driver of their consumption choices: many stopped eating meat
after a “shock”, for instance after being exposed to the slaughter of an animal,
witnessing violence towards animals, or reading an influential book such as those of
Pollan (2006) and Safran Foer (2010).
Most accounts of the meat paradox postulate that individuals engage in a self-
serving rationalization process by which they distort their own perception of animals
(e.g., of their capacity to suffer) and of industrial farming practices in order to justify
their consumption of meat. While the evidence described above is consistent with
motivated reasoning, it does not by itself rule out more standard alternatives. For
instance, the disagreement and difference in behavior between vegetarians and om-
nivores could be due to heterogeneous private information, instead of being driven
by self-serving moral reasoning. However, a series of experiments documents that
beliefs about animals are easily malleable and affected by treatment manipulations
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that do not provide any legitimate information about animals or industrial farming,
but vary the perceived moral consequences of meat consumption. In particular, in-
dividuals tend to ascribe lower cognitive ability and capacity to suffer to animals
that are used for human consumption.
Bastian et al. (2012) reports a negative correlation between animals’ edibility
and their perceived mental capacities. This is illustrated on Figure 1: Dogs, cats
and horses, as well as monkeys and lions, for instance, score high on cognitive
ability, and low on edibility, while chicken, cows and sheeps score high on edibility,
but low on cognitive ability. Bratanova et al. (2011) provide causal evidence for
this relationship. They exogenously manipulate whether an animal is presented
as “food”, whether the animal has been killed or not, and whether humans are
responsible for its death. They find that categorizing an animal as“food”reduces the
animal’s perceived capacity to suffer, and, in turn, reduces people’s moral concern
for this animal.3 Bastian et al. (2012) also document that people ascribe fewer
mental capacities to an animal (a sheep or a cow) when they are reminded that the
animal will be used for meat consumption. In a follow-up experiment, Bastian et al.
(2012) randomly assign subjects to a condition where they would have to eat cold
cuts of roast beef, or to a condition where they would have to eat slices of apple.
Prior to eating the food, subjects are given the chance to rate the moral capacities of
cows. Participants who expect the opportunity to eat beef in the immediate future
report lower cognitive capacities for cows. Loughnan et al. (2010) also find that
subjects who were offered “beef jerky” at the beginning of the experiment report
later a lower moral concern for animals (in particular, for cows) than those who
were offered “dried nuts”.4
Another finding inconsistent with the Bayesian model of belief formation is that
many consumers appear to be willfully ignorant about the realities of animal welfare
in industrial farming. Among the 1,000 respondents surveyed in Oklahoma by Bell
et al. (2017), about one-third prefer looking at a blank screen rather than receiving
information about how swine are raised.5 In addition, a substantial fraction report
that they do so in order not to feel guilty when they purchase meat in the future.
Together, information avoidance and the sensitivity of beliefs to manipulations of
the perceived moral consequences of eating meat substantiate the role of self-serving
belief formation, which is the key ingredient of the model developed in Section 3.
3However, they do not find any effect of the two other treatments.
4Nevertheless, the treatment did not significantly affect beliefs about cows’ cognitive ability
and capacity to experience a variety of mental states such as happiness, pain, etc.
5See also Onwezen and van der Weele (2016), who report that 27% of people confess that they
remain willfully ignorant about animal farming.
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Figure 1 – Source: Bastian et al. (2012) The graph displays ratings given to
different animal species regarding their cognitive abilities (”Mind”, measured on
the horizontal axis) and their edibility, measured on the vertical axis.
2.2 Motivated beliefs in moral dilemmata
Researchers from several disciplines (economics, philosophy, psychology) have
long debated the nature of pro-social preferences, with a particular interest in the
sincerity of other-regarding behavior. Recent research supports the view that, in
many situations of interest, individuals like to feel altruistic, or at least moral, with-
out necessarily being altruistic, as evidenced by their strategic use of uncertainty
or other contextual excuses to rationalize their opportunistic behavior (Dana et al.,
2007; Exley, 2015), or their avoidance of situations where a pro-social action is
expected (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2017). To resolve the tension
between a desire to pursue one’s material interest and the belief that a pro-social
action is morally appropriate, individuals tend to form self-serving fairness judg-
ments and beliefs about the consequences of their actions on others, in order to
justify selfish behavior (see Andreoni and Sanchez, 2014; Di Tella et al., 2015 for
examples, and Gino et al., 2016 for a survey). Another facet of this strategy is that
many individuals actively avoid information about the externalities generated by
their actions (Dana et al., 2007; Shu and Gino, 2012; Van der Weele, 2014), and
seek pre- or post-justifications to downplay a moral violation (Barkan et al., 2015;
Shalvi et al., 2015).
Several papers have analyzed the role of self- or social image in shaping individ-
uals’ perceptions in moral dilemmata. Grossman and van der Weele (2017) show
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that individuals motivated by self-image concerns might avoid information about
the externalities generated by their actions and behave selfishly. Be´nabou et al.
(2018) and Foerster and van der Weele (2018a) analyze belief formation in settings
where individuals communicate about the magnitude of the externality (see also
the experiment by Foerster and van der Weele, 2018b). Our model focuses on in-
dividual belief formation and relies on a different foundation than these papers, as
the utility-relevance of beliefs is due to a cost of guilt caused by consumption rather
than an image component. The focus on a specific consumption problem also allows
us to derive new predictions, such as the effect of prices on beliefs.
Our theory builds on a growing literature in behavioral economics that departs
from the classical view that beliefs are a function of information only, and that
models belief formation as the result of a (constrained) optimization problem (see
the survey by Be´nabou and Tirole, 2016). Formally, our model builds on the archi-
tecture proposed by Be´nabou and Tirole in a series of papers,6 in which beliefs are
the outcome of an intrapersonal Bayesian equilibrium. However, the insights of the
theory are robust to other specifications of the process of belief formation, such as
the one proposed by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) in which individuals are free
to choose their beliefs without any constraint (see the supplementary appendix).
3 Model
3.1 Primitives
Information and preferences An individual selects a quantity c ∈ R+ of meat
available at a unit price p ≥ 0. Her taste for meat is represented by the utility
function U : R+ → R defined over her consumption level c. The function U is twice
continuously differentiable and satisfies U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, and U ′(0) < +∞.
On top of the material component U(c)−pc, the individual’s preferences include
some moral concerns: she feels guilt from being responsible for externalities imposed
on animals. However, she is uncertain about the true level of the externality associ-
ated with meat consumption: for instance, she is unsure about the conditions under
which animals are raised, about their capacity to feel pain and pleasure, etc. All
the uncertainty is captured by a single random variable X, which takes a high value
X = xH > 0 or a low value X = xL (0 < xL < xH) with equal prior probabilities.
The agent’s consumption of meat c generates a negative externality equal to −Xc.
The states X = xH and X = xL convey different moral obligations: the externality
6See Be´nabou and Tirole (2002); Be´nabou and Tirole (2004); Be´nabou and Tirole (2006);
Be´nabou and Tirole (2011), and Be´nabou (2013).
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inflicted on animals by meat consumption is greater if X = xH . However, since the
individual is uncertain about the state, she evaluates the externality according to
her subjective expectation x˜ = EX and incurs a moral cost of guilt equal to −ωx˜c.
The parameter ω ≥ 0 represents the individual’s degree of morality, or the extent
to which she internalizes the externality in her behavior. The individual’s prior
expectation of X equals 1/2xL + 1/2xH . All in all, c is selected according to the
following problem:
max
c∈R+
U(c)− pc− ωx˜c. (1)
We write c∗(x˜) for the (unique) optimal solution of this program when the individual
has perception x˜ at the time of choice. Equation 1 yields
c∗(x˜) = max {(U ′)−1(p+ ωx˜), 0}. (2)
The optimal consumption level c∗(x˜) is decreasing with all three variables p, ω and
x˜. We also write
V (x˜) = U(c∗(x˜))− (p+ ωx˜)c∗(x˜) (3)
for the perceived indirect utility defined as a function of beliefs. The function V is
nonincreasing in x˜.
Timeline The formation of beliefs is modeled as the result of an intra-personal
game played by two successive incarnations (Self 0 and Self 1) of the same individual.
At date 0, Self 0 receives some information about X. For instance, she might learn
about the living conditions of the cattle, watch a video recorded in a slaughterhouse,
or learn some information about animals’ capacity to experience pain and pleasure.
For simplicity, we assume that the signal takes only two values: bad news (m =
mH), or good news (m = mL). The signal is perfect, that is, characterized by
p(m = mH | X = xH) = p(m = mL | X = xL) = 1. A signal m = mH is thus to be
interpreted as an indication that the externalities of meat consumption are large,
whereas a signal m = mL indicates that the externalities are small.
At date 1, once the individual has formed her beliefs she selects c according to
Equation 2 and receives her consumption utility. The moral cost is paid at date 2.
t=0 t=1 t=2
- receive m
- transmit mˆ = mH
or mˆ = mL
- receive mˆ
- choose c
- derive U(c)− pc
- derive −ωx˜c
b b b
Figure 2 – Timeline
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Motivated reasoning In line with the literature on motivated beliefs formation,
we assume that the individual has the desire and the capacity to distort her per-
ception of the consequences of her actions. We assume that good news m = mL
are truthfully encoded by the decision-maker and focus on her reaction to bad news
m = mH . When she receives the message m = mH , she might either incorporate
this piece of information into her beliefs; or, she might incur an effort in order to
repress the signal, look actively for contradicting pieces of evidence, or engage in
any other self-deception strategy that downplays the meaning of the information
she just received. We follow the memory-management model proposed by Be´n-
abou and Tirole and model the choice of information processing in an intrapersonal
game-theoretic framework. When Self 0 receives the signal m = mH , she can either
truthfully transmit mˆ = mH to her future incarnation or mis-encode the signal and
transmit mˆ = mL at a psychic cost k ≥ 0 instead. The parameter k (see Equation
5 below) represents the hedonic disutility incurred by the individual if she engages
in self-deception.
The individual is forward-looking when she selects mˆ. More precisely, she antic-
ipates that her cognitive choice will affect the consumption level c(x˜) selected by her
incarnation at date 1, as well as the moral cost of guilt ωx˜c(x˜) that she will incur.
By denying the “bad news”m = mH , the individual alleviates her perceived moral
obligations towards animals, and can thus select a higher level of meat consumption.
3.2 Equilibrium concept
The cognitive decision mˆ at date 0 is modeled as the equilibrium outcome of
the interaction between the individual’s Self 0, who chooses the information, and
the individual’s Self 1, who makes the consumption decision. We make two impor-
tant assumptions regarding this interaction. First, Self 0 fully internalizes Self 1’s
perceived utility of consumption without taking into account the true value of the
externality. For instance, if Self 0 believes that X = xH but deceives Self 1 into
thinking that EX = x˜, Self 0 receives the utility
U(c∗(x˜))− (p+ ωx˜)c∗(x˜).
By contrast, if Self 0 were concerned about the true state of the world (and not
only about Self 1’s perception of it), she would derive the utility
U(c∗(x˜)− (p+ ωxH)c
∗(x˜).
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and there would be no scope for self-deception, as truthful encoding would be opti-
mal. Motivated reasoning arises in this model since the individual is only concerned
by her future perception when she chooses her beliefs.
Second, the two players (Self 0 and Self 1) are strategic and Bayesian. In par-
ticular, Self 1 performs Bayesian updating when she receives good news (mˆ = mL)
and considers the possibility that her Self 0 has mis-encoded a signal m = mH . This
assumption of sophistication constrains the self-deception process but does not elim-
inate the possibility to distort one’s beliefs. Following the message mˆ = mH , Self
1’s perception is equal to xH . Following the message mˆ = mL and given Self 0’s
habitual strategy σ, Self 1 forms an expectation equal to
x˜(σ) :=
1− σ
2− σ
xH +
1
2− σ
xL. (4)
The posterior expectation x˜(σ) is decreasing in σ: the higher the individual’s
habitual probability of transmitting bad news, the more the individual trusts her
recollection mˆ = mL and believes that the message sent was uninformative. In
contrast, an individual who always denies bad news (σ = 0) stays with her prior
beliefs irrespective of her recollection.
We look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game. An equilibrium is charac-
terized by: (i) Self 0’s probability σ ∈ [0, 1] of accepting bad news, i.e. of transmit-
ting mˆ = mH conditional on m = mH ; this decision is made optimally conditional
on Self 1’s behavioral response; (ii) Self 1’s consumption decision c(σ, mˆ) at date
1 conditional on the transmitted signal mˆ and on Self 0’s equilibrium strategy σ.
All beliefs are derived according to Bayes’ rule. Formally, σ is optimally chosen to
satisfy
σ ∈ argmax
t∈[0,1]
tV (xH) + (1− t)V (x˜(σ))− k(1− t) (5)
whereas the consumption level c(σ, mˆ) following the transmitted signal mˆ in this
equilibrium is optimally chosen to satisfy
c(σ,mH) = c
∗(xH) and c(σ,mL) = c
∗(x˜(σ)), respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Equilibrium behavior
Equation 5 shows that: (i) realism (σ = 1) is an equilibrium if and only if
V (x˜(1))− V (xH) ≤ k; (ii) denial (σ = 0) is an equilibrium if and only if V (x˜(0))−
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V (xH) ≥ k; (iii) any σ ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies V (x˜(σ))−V (xH) = k is an equilibrium
strategy.
Equation 4 shows that the benefit V (x˜(σ)) − V (xH) of denial is nondecreasing
with σ, the level of (habitual) realism, strictly so if the individual’s consumption
c(x˜(σ)) is positive. This observation shows the existence and uniqueness of the
intra-personal equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium of the game characterized by
thresholds 0 < k1 < k2 such that: (i) if k ≤ k1, the individual denies bad news
(σ = 0); (ii) if k ≥ k2, the individual accepts bad news (σ = 1); (iii) if k ∈ (k1, k2),
σ is a strictly increasing function of k.
In a population with heterogeneous costs of denial, individuals with the lowest
k are thus the most likely to engage in self-deception. Consider for instance two
individuals, 1 and 2, playing the cognitive strategies σ = 1 (realism) and σ = 0
(denial), respectively. Conditional on the message m = mH , individual 1 forms
a subjective expectation equal to xH , and consumes a quantity c
∗(xH), whereas
individual 2 forms an expectation equal to x˜(0) < xH and consumes a quantity
c∗(x˜(0)) ≥ c∗(xH). In equilibrium, there is thus a negative association between
people’s subjective expectation of the level of the externality, and their consumption
of meat.
4.2 Comparative statics
In this subsection we investigate how the parameters of the decision problem
affect the individual’s propensity to engage in self-deception, as characterized by
her equilibrium strategy σ, and her resulting consumption decision.
4.2.1 Taste for meat
We start by analyzing the role of individuals’ taste for meat in their cognitive
choices. Our comparative statics analysis consists in comparing two individuals
who only differ in the utility U that they derive from meat consumption. As a first
step, suppose that, starting from the belief x˜ and the resulting consumption level
c(x˜), the individual can marginally reduce the value of x˜ to x˜− ϵ. By the envelope
theorem, the marginal benefit derived from this change in belief equals wc(x˜)ϵ.
This shows that the benefit from self-deception at any belief x˜ is proportional to
the agent’s consumption level c(x˜) at this belief. Proposition 2, proved formally in
the Appendix, states that a higher taste for meat is associated with a lower level of
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realism: individuals who have a higher taste for meat are more likely to resort to
self-deception. This effect further increases the difference between the (equilibrium)
consumption levels of individuals who have heterogeneous preferences.
Proposition 2. Individuals with the highest taste for meat are the most prone
to self-deception. Suppose that the utility functions UA and UB satisfy (U
′
A)
−1 ≥
(U ′B)
−1, which implies that, with identical beliefs, individual A consumes more than
individual B. Then σA ≤ σB.
4.2.2 Price increase
In a standard model without self-deception, an increase in the price of meat
directly decreases individuals’ consumption. In this section, we show that the model
of motivated reasoning also uniquely predicts that an increase in the price increases
consumers’ awareness of the moral consequences of their actions: the intuition is
that a higher price lowers the agents’ baseline consumption, making it less profitable
to deny bad news in order to rationalize their behavior.
Let us index consumption by the price, and write c(x˜, p) for the consumption
level of the agent in a situation with price p and beliefs x˜. Suppose that the
unit price of meat decreases marginally to p − ϵ. By the envelope theorem, the
marginal utility for the agent resulting from this price increase equals wc(x˜, p)ϵ. The
benefit from self-deception, V (x˜(0)) − V (xH), is therefore increased by a quantity
w[c(x˜(0), p)− c(xH , p)]ϵ, which is nonnegative since x˜(0) ≤ xH : a marginal decrease
in the price benefits relatively more to the agent in the scenario where she holds
beliefs x˜(0) than in the scenario where she holds beliefs xH , as she consumes a higher
quantity of meat in the former case. As a result, decreasing the price magnifies the
returns to self-deception or, equivalently, the agent’s level of realism increases with
the unit price of meat. At the limit where p → +∞, the agent does not consume
any meat irrespective of her beliefs, and therefore she has no incentives to deceive
herself (σ = 1).
Proposition 3. The individual becomes more realistic when the unit price of meat
increases: σ is a nondecreasing function of p. In addition, there exists two thresholds
p1 and p2 such that σ(p) = 0 if and only if p ≤ p1 and σ(p) = 1 if and only if p ≥ p2.
In this model, an increase in the price therefore reduces consumption by two
channels: a direct channel (for fixed beliefs), and an indirect channel (through the
change in beliefs). The price elasticity of meat consumption is therefore larger than
in a model with exogenous beliefs. To see this, consider the thresholds p1 and p2
defined in Proposition 3 (cf. Figure 3). In the region [p1, p2] the individual plays
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the mixed strategy σ(p).7 A first observation is that, if the price switches from p1 to
p2, the individual’s perception switches from x˜(0) to xH : her consumption response
equals c∗(xH , p2)− c
∗(x˜(0), p1), which we rewrite
c∗(xH , p2)− c
∗(xH , p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ c∗(xH , p1)− c
∗(x˜(0), p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
.
Both effects are nonpositive: the indirect effect thus crowds in the standard decrease
in consumption that follows from an increase in the price. The total variation is of
a larger magnitude than the price response in a model without strategic denial.
Proposition 4. The expected consumption is nonincreasing with p. In addition,
there exist two thresholds p1 < p2 such that:
1. When p ≤ p1, σ = 0 and the individual’s perception equals x˜(0). The price
elasticity of her demand is identical to a standard model with unit monetary
price p+ x˜(0).
2. When p ≥ p2, σ = 1 and the individual’s perception equals xH . The price
elasticity of her demand is identical to a standard model with unit monetary
price p+ xH .
3. When p ∈ [p1, p2], σ is an increasing function of p and the individual gradu-
ally incorporates moral concerns into her consumption choice. The (absolute)
consumption response to a price variation is larger than in a model without
denial.
4.2.3 Moral concerns
We now turn to analyzing the effect of an increase in the parameter ω. This
parameter can be interpreted as the individual’s own feelings of guilt or empathy
towards animals, or as the moral pressure imposed by social concerns on the indi-
vidual’s behavior. In the former case, our results speak to whether more altruistic
individuals are more likely to form correct beliefs; in the latter case, our results
speak to whether aggressive advertising campaigns (e.g., by animal rights activists)
that aim at increasing the moral stigma are effective to reduce consumption.
In this paragraph, we show that the comparative statics in ω depends on the
elasticity of the individual’s demand. More precisely, we show that an increase in
7Since σ is defined by the implicit equation V (x˜(σ(p))) − V (xH) = k, the implicit function
theorem shows that σ is a continuously differentiable function of p in that region.
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c∗(xH , p) c
∗(x˜0, p)
Denial Mixed strategy Realism
p1 p2
c
p
Figure 3 – Consumption c as a function of the price p
the moral cost associated with meat consumption makes individuals more realistic if
and only if their consumption of meat is sufficiently elastic. Consumers with elastic
demand are those willing to adapt their behavior to a change in the parameters
(price and moral cost); when the moral cost associated with meat consumption in-
creases, they react by lowering their consumption, e.g. by becoming vegetarians. In
contrast, consumers with inelastic demand are unwilling to lower their consumption;
as a consequence, following an increase in the perceived guilt, they are more likely
to resort to motivated cognition in order to alleviate the psychological disutility
associated with their behavior.
Formally, note that the the psychological benefit of playing the strategy σ = 0
(denying the externality) equals
ω[xHc
∗(xH)− x˜(0)c
∗(x˜(0))].
Suppose first that c∗(xH) = 0, for a given value of ω. The individual responds to an
increase in her perception of the externality by becoming a vegetarian, which makes
her insensitive to any moral pressure. In that case, an increase in ω reduces the
benefit from rejecting bad news. Among the consumers who are (hypothetically)
willing to become vegetarians if they adopt the signal m = mH , an increase in the
moral cost makes the individuals more prone to accept the evidence.
Suppose by contrast that c∗(xH) ∼ c
∗(x˜(0)) > 0, meaning that the elasticity
of demand is small. In that case, a marginal increase in ω does not trigger any
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behavioral response but magnifies the psychological cost incurred from meat con-
sumption. Increasing ω therefore gives the individual larger incentives to deny the
evidence and avoid thinking about the consequences of her consumption of meat.
Among the consumers who have an inelastic demand for meat, those who are the
most empathic towards animals are also the most likely to engage in wishful thinking
and rationalize the evidence away.
To formalize this result, let
ϵU ′(c) = −
cU ′′(c)
U ′(c)− p
be the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (net of the unit price) with
respect to the consumption level c. This preference parameter is inversely related
(ϵU ′(c) = 1/ϵc∗(x) where c
∗(x) = c) to the elasticity of consumption relative to the
perception x˜, equal to
ϵc∗(x) = −
x˜(c∗)′(x˜)
c∗(x˜)
.
Proposition 5. Consider some ω ≥ 0, and the corresponding consumption level
c∗(xH , ω) under realism. If c
∗(xH , ω) = 0, the individual becomes more realistic (i.e.
σ is nondecreasing) when ω increases. If c∗(xH , ω) > 0, two cases arise:
(i) Inelastic demand: if ϵU ′(c) > 1 for all c > 0, the individual becomes less
realistic (i.e. σ is nonincreasing) when ω increases.
(ii) Elastic demand: if ϵU ′(c) < 1 for all c > 0, the individual becomes more
realistic (i.e. σ is nondecreasing) when ω increases.
4.3 Attitude towards information
Finally, we turn to analyzing the individual’s attitude towards information from
the ex-ante perspective. We investigate the agent’s binary decision of whether to
acquire the signal or not.
We show in this section that an individual’s attitude towards information de-
pends on her equilibrium cognitive strategy σ: individuals are information-averse if
and only if they engage in self-deception. Since incorrect updating is difficult to doc-
ument empirically, whereas attitudes towards information are more easily elicited,
motivated reasoning is often (indirectly) documenting by providing evidence of will-
ful ignorance (Onwezen and van der Weele, 2016; Bell et al., 2017). Proposition 6
below shows that our model provides a possible foundation for information-avoiding
behavior.
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For simplicity we focus on the two polar cases of complete realism (σ = 1)
and complete denial (σ = 0). Suppose first that the parameters are such that the
individual remains realistic in the unique equilibrium (σ = 1). Intuitively, there
is no conflict of preferences between her two incarnations, who both would like to
become better informed in order to make a correct decision. The individual benefits
from receiving information, exactly as in a standard model. If the individual does
not receive any information, she keeps her prior perception and her welfare equals
V (x˜(0)). If, in contrast, she receives the signal, her posterior beliefs are equal to xH
with probability 1/2 and x˜(1) with probability 1/2, and her expected welfare thus
equals
1
2
V (xH) +
1
2
V (x˜(1)).
Her attitude towards information is therefore pinned down by the convexity of
the indirect utility function V in the variable x. Since V ′(x) = −ωc∗(x), V is
convex in x, strictly so in the region where c∗(x) > 0. Realistic individuals are
therefore information-loving, strictly so if their baseline consumption of meat absent
information is positive.
Suppose now that the individual denies bad news (σ = 0). She forms the same
perception equal to x˜(0), whether she receives some information or not. However,
if she receives the information she pays a cost of denial k > 0 with probability 1/2.
Intuitively, providing information is useless to the agent since it does not affect her
consumption decisions, but it makes her psychologically worse-off due to the cost
associated with rationalizing undesirable signals away.
Proposition 6. Under realism (if σ = 1), the individual is information-loving.
Under denial (σ = 0), the individual is strictly information-averse.
4.4 Extension: consumption externalities
We have so far considered the case of a single agent. To analyze the inter-
dependencies between the cognitive strategies and the consumption decisions of
different individuals, we now introduce consumption externalities in the model. We
assume that individuals’ psychological utility is negatively affected not only by their
own consumption of meat but also by the aggregate consumption, reflecting the idea
that they genuinely care about the welfare of animals, irrespective of whether or not
they are responsible for the suffering inflicted. The main result from this section is
that individuals’ cognitive choices are strategic complements, as in Be´nabou (2013),
which gives rise to the coexistence of two equilibria: one “realistic” equilibrium
where individuals form correct beliefs and consume small amounts, and one“denial”
18
equilibrium where individuals perceive a lower externality than the actual one, and
consume large amounts.
We assume that the economy is composed of n + 1 agents who have identical
preference parameters (U, ω, k) and receive a common signal m at date 0, generated
as explained in Section 3. The presence of other individuals modifies the analysis of
the individual decision problem in two ways. First, we assume common knowledge of
rationality. Therefore, at date 2, the individual observes the consumption decisions
of her peers, and revises her beliefs about X according to this observation, as the
behavior of other individuals might reveal some information about m that the agent
has repressed. Importantly, we assume that the agent cannot distort her beliefs
about X again if she receives an informative signal, reflecting the idea that the
choices of other agents are observed regularly and are more difficult to rationalize
away than the original signal.
Second, the individual is directly harmed by others’ consumption of meat. This
specification is in line with the interpretation of the model in which individuals
have empathic feelings towards animals irrespective of whether the harm is caused
by their own or someone else’s decisions. Agent i’s utility if she forms an expectation
equal to x˜i now equals
V˜ (c, x˜i) = U(ci)− pci − ωx˜ici − ξx˜i
∑
j ̸=i
cj. (6)
The parameter ω still represents the cost of guilt caused by the individual’s own
consumption. The parameter ξ measures the agent’s altruism towards animals, and
describes the extent to which she internalizes the aggregate externality caused by
collective decisions.
The timing of the model is as follows. At date 0, all individuals (simultaneously)
choose how to process the common signal. At date 1, they form their recollection,
update their beliefs, and (simultaneously) make their consumption decisions. At
date 2, they observe their peers’ consumption decisions, revise their beliefs about
X, and receive the utility level given by Equation 6.
For simplicity, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which all individuals play a
pure cognitive strategy (either σ = 0 or σ = 1), and we assume that the parameters
of the model are such that c∗(x˜(0)) > 0, meaning that consumption of meat is
positive if individuals stay with their prior beliefs.
Collective realism Let us first study the conditions under which collective real-
ism is an equilibrium. Suppose first that all agents remain realistic and consume
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c∗(xH) conditional on the messagem = mH . If agent i accepts the evidencem = mH
she receives the utility V (xH)− ξnxHc
∗(xH), where V is defined in Equation 3. In
contrast, if she denies the evidence and encodes m = mL, she perceives an external-
ity equal to x˜(1) and thus consumes c∗(x˜(1)). But once she observes the behavior of
her peers, who consume c∗(xH) < c
∗(x˜(1)),8 she infers that the externality is high
and that she has deceived herself into denying the evidence. She then pays a large
moral cost for her suboptimally large consumption. Overall, she receives the utility
(c∗(x˜(1)))− (p+ ωxH)c
∗(x˜(1))− ξnxHc
∗(xH) < V (xH)− ξnxHc
∗(xH)
Realism is therefore a symmetric equilibrium strategy for any k ≥ 0. In this equi-
librium, the incentives to rationalize the evidence away are limited since observing
others consuming small quantities makes it impossible for the individual to ignore
the externality generated by meat consumption. All in all, the presence of other re-
alistic agents therefore gives the individual higher incentives to accept the evidence.
Collective denial Consider now a candidate equilibrium where all individuals
deny the evidence and thus consume c∗(x˜(0)). If agent i deviates and accepts the
evidence m = mH , she receives the utility V (xH) − ξnxHc
∗(x˜(0)). If she plays
the equilibrium strategy σ = 0, she forms the perception x˜(0) and observes that
all other agents consume c∗(x˜(0)): hence, she does not revise her beliefs about m,
knowing that others have deceived themselves as well, and she receives the utility
V (x˜(0)) − ξnx˜(0)c∗(x˜(0)). Since all players deny the evidence, their consumption
decisions are not informative about the original public message, which increases the
scope for self-deception. Denial is an equilibrium strategy if and only if
V (x˜(0))− V (xH) + ξn[xH − x˜(0)]c
∗(x˜(0)) ≥ k (7)
The left-hand side of Equation 7 is increasing in n. Intuitively, the presence of
other agents who consume a positive amount of meat c∗(x˜(0)) creates a psychological
cost for any individual; as a result, the larger the aggregate consumption nc∗(x˜(0)),
the larger the individual incentives to downplay the magnitude of the externality.
The existence of deniers thus further encourages denial. As a consequence, the
cognitive strategies of different individuals are strategic complements, and multiple
equilibria might co-exist.
Proposition 7. Suppose that c∗(x˜(0)) > 0. Then collective realism (σ = 1) is an
8Indeed, the assumption c∗(x˜(0)) > 0 implies that c∗(x˜(1)) > c∗(x˜(0)) > c∗(xH).
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equilibrium. In addition, there exists n0 ∈ N such that, for all n ≥ n0, collective
denial (σ = 0) is also an equilibrium.
5 Discussion
We conclude by discussing the model and delineating some avenues for future
research.
Demand for animal welfare Our model is based on the assumption that indi-
viduals factor in ethical concerns in their meat consumption decisions. The evidence
about the role of ethical concerns appears to be contradictory. On the one hand,
animal-friendly products only represent a small market share. On the other hand,
some experiments or surveys on consumers’ willingness-to-pay for animal welfare
identify that many individuals are willing to pay a premium for animal welfare that
is higher than the cost premium. This result is not restricted to hypothetical choices
but also survives, to a large extent, to the introduction of real incentives. For in-
stance, in the experiment by Albrecht et al. (2017), 37% of subjects are willing to
pay 25 euros or more to put a living hen into better conditions (organic farming)
than intensive farming facilities, and the average willingness-to-pay equals 14 eu-
ros. Consumers also express a concern for animal welfare in the voting booth: As
an illustration, in 2008 Californian voters accepted with a large majority (63.5%
of ballots) a proposition meant to reduce the confinement of farm animals.9 This
observation might seem surprising, as the conventional products that the law bans
(battery cages, veal crates, gestation crates, etc.) largely dominated the Californian
market at the time of the referendum. As Norwood and Lusk (2011) put it in their
“California egg paradox”: “Why are consumers seemingly so compassionate in the
voting booth and yet so indifferent in the grocery store?”
These findings point to the difficulty of retrieving the importance of moral con-
cerns from people’s consumption, as their decisions seem inconsistent across decision
problems. One hypothesis that could explain these observations is that the salience
of the moral consequences of one’s choices is not the same in the grocery store, in
the lab, and in the voting booth: The low salience of animal welfare in the grocery
store might help consumers divert their own attention away from the moral aspect of
their decisions at little psychological cost, while the high salience of animal welfare
9This “Proposition 2” stated: “a person shall not tether or confine any covered animal, on a
farm, for all or the majority of any day, in a manner that prevents such animal from: a) Lying
down, standing up, and fully extending his or her limbs; and b) Turning around freely.” Similar
laws were voted in several states in the US.
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concerns in lab experiments and in the referendum mentioned above might make
it more difficult to engage in self-deception.10 This can be understood through the
lens of our model if the cost k of self-deception is allowed to be context-dependent.
Alternatively, individuals might view animal welfare as a public good and might be
reluctant to provide it privately (as consumers) but willing to vote for policies that
regulate the externality, as in a standard public-good model. The private demand
for animal welfare reported in lab experiments could then be driven by experimenter
demand effects or social desirability biases. In any case, further research should try
to provide a resolution of the above puzzle by carefully exploring the determinants
of people’s consumption decisions.
Information supply Our model focuses on the demand side of information and
belief formation by assuming that the signal received by the decision-maker is ex-
ogenous. In practice, this information is often provided by interest groups that face
incentives to try manipulating consumers’ beliefs.
On one side of the spectrum, the meat sector has strong incentives to lobby
against information provision, or to obfuscate the information received by con-
sumers. Some existing laws in the US, such as the Animal Enterprise Terrorism
Act (AETA), which criminalizes the release of images and videos in the farming
industry on the grounds of violation of private property, are sometimes accused
of being primarily motivated by a desire to hide the reality of farming practices
from consumers.11 Our model shows that this supply-side strategy is actually com-
plemented, on the demand side, by the behavior of deniers, who do not have any
incentives to acquire information about animal farming (Proposition 6). This con-
trasts with a standard communication game (e.g., cheap talk) where both parties
have conflicting interests.
On the other side of the spectrum, groups of animal activists have the op-
posite interests, as they would benefit from informing the population about the
objective realities of animal farming. Interestingly, these groups often attempt to
directly influence consumers’ attitudes through “shock” information campaigns cen-
tered on emotionally disturbing content (e.g., comparisons between meat products
10Interestingly, Norwood and Lusk (2011) document that the demand for free-range eggs has
increased by 180% in California during the ballot period, suggesting a potential effect of the
political debate on consumers’ demand.
11For instance, the New York times (New York Times, 2013) interprets such “aggag” laws (i.e.,
antiwhistle blower laws in the agricultural industry) as follows: “The socalled ‘aggag’ laws now
being considered by several states, including California, Illinois and Indiana, have nothing to do
with protecting property. Their only purpose is to keep consumers in the dark, to make sure we
know as little as possible about the grim details of factory farming. These bills are pushed by
intensive lobbying from agribusiness corporations and animal production groups.”
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and human bodies) rather than on statistical information about the meat industry.
Nevertheless, these tactics seem to have had limited success so far. One possible hy-
pothesis, consistent with our model, is that these information campaigns target the
parameter ω of our model and seek to increase the guilt induced by meat consump-
tion. As shown in Proposition 5, this strategy might be efficient for some consumer
types (those with elastic preferences) but inefficient or even counter-productive for
others (those with inelastic preferences). More generally, understanding the effects
of activists’ and lobbyists’ communication strategies when consumers are prone to
self-deception is an important topic, that we leave for future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Define k1 = V (x˜(0)) − V (xH) and k2 = V (x˜(1)) −
V (xH). Both k1 and k2 are nonnegative. The function σ → V (x˜(σ)) − V (xH) is
nondecreasing in σ and maps [0, 1] into [k1, k2]. Three cases arise:
(i) If k2 ≤ k, σ = 1 is an equilibrium, uniquely so if k2 < k.
(ii) If k1 ≥ k, σ = 0 is an equilibrium, uniquely so if k1 > k.
(iii) If k ∈ [k1, k2], the intermediate value theorem applies since the function V ◦ x˜
is continuous, and therefore there exists some σ ∈ [0, 1] such that V (x˜(σ)) −
V (xH) = k.
To prove the uniqueness, suppose that σ1 < σ2 are both equilibrium solutions.
This implies that
V (x˜(σ1)) ≥ V (x˜(σ2)). (8)
Indeed, σ2 > 0 implies that V (x˜(σ2)) − V (xH) ≤ k, whereas σ1 < 1 implies that
V (x˜(σ1))− V (xH) ≥ k.
Since V ◦ x˜ is strictly increasing on the range of σ that delivers positive con-
sumption levels c∗(x˜(σ)), Equation 8 is possible only if c∗(x˜(σ1)) = c
∗(x˜(σ2)) = 0.
As a consequence, the monotonicity of c∗ implies that c∗(xH) = 0, and therefore
V (x˜(σi))−V (xH) = 0 < k for i = 1, 2. This contradicts V (x˜(σ1))−V (xH) ≥ k.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let cA(x˜) = max [(U ′A)−1(p+ wx˜), 0] and cB be defined
similarly. Let σA be agent A’s equilibrium strategy. At this equilibrium level, agent
A’s benefit from self-deception equals VA(x˜(σA))− VA(xH). The crucial step in the
proof is to show that
VB(x˜(σA))− VB(xH) ≤ VA(x˜(σA))− VA(xH). (9)
Once this is established, the result σB ≥ σA follows immediately from the analysis
of the intra-personal equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Note that for inequality 9 to hold, a sufficient condition is that the function
x→ VB(x˜)− VA(x˜) is nondecreasing in x˜, since x˜(σA) ≤ xH . But, by the envelope
theorem,
∂VA(x˜)
∂x˜
= −ωcA(x˜)
and, similarly,
∂VB(x˜)
∂x˜
= −ωcB(x˜).
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As a consequence,
∂[VB(x˜)− VA(x˜)]
∂x˜
= ω[cA(x˜)− cB(x˜)] ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider a price level p and the resulting equilibrium
cognitive strategy σ. Let us write the indirect utility function as a function V (x˜, p)
of beliefs and price. At this equilibrium, the agent’s benefit from self-deception
equals V (x˜(σ), p)− V (xH , p). By the envelope theorem,
∂[V (x˜(σ), p)− V (xH , p)]
∂p
= c(xH , p)− c(x˜(σ), p) ≤ 0
and thus the net benefit from self-deception is nonincreasing with the price: this ob-
servation, together with the analysis of the intra-personal equilibrium in Proposition
1, proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 5 Let us write the indirect utility function as a function
V (x˜, ω) of beliefs and ω. Applying the envelop theorem yields
∂[V (x˜(σ), ω)− V (xH , ω)])
∂ω
= −x˜(σ)c∗(x˜(σ), ω) + xHc
∗(xH , ω). (10)
If c∗(xH , ω) = 0, this expression is nonpositive, therefore σ is nondecreasing in ω.
Suppose otherwise that c∗(xH , ω) > 0, which implies that for all x˜ ≤ xH ,
c∗(x˜, ω) = (U ′)−1(p + ωx˜). If the function x˜ → x˜c∗(x˜, ω) defined on [xL, xH ] is
strictly increasing, expression 10 is nonnegative and therefore σ is nonincreasing in
ω. This is true if
−
x˜(c∗)′(x˜, ω)
c∗(x˜, ω)
< 1⇔ −
ωx˜
U ′′[(U ′)−1(p+ ωx˜)](U ′)−1(p+ ωx˜)
< 1
⇔ −
U ′′[(U ′)−1(p+ ωx˜)](U ′)−1(p+ ωx˜)
ωx˜
> 1
⇔ ϵU ′ [(U
′)−1(p+ ωx˜)] > 1.
The case ϵU ′(c) < 1 is symmetric.
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Supplementary Appendix to “An economic model of the
meat paradox”
Nina Hestermann, Yves Le Yaouanq, and Nicolas Treich
This supplementary appendix shows that the theory makes analogous predic-
tions if motivated belief formation is represented using the cognitive dissonance
model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), instead of the memory management
model considered in the paper.
Let the indirect utility be defined as follows:
V (x˜) = max
c≥0
U(c)− pc− ωx˜c
= U(c∗(x˜))− pc∗(x˜)− ωx˜c∗(x˜).
Let x˜(t) = txH + (1 − t)xL be the subjective expectation about animal suffering.
Suppose now that the consumer observes that the level of animal suffering is xH .
Following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), the beliefs’ choice problem can now be
written as follows:
max
t∈[0,1]
(1− k)V (x˜(t)) + k[U(c∗(x˜(t))− pc(x˜(t))− ωxHc
∗(x˜(t))]. (11)
This model describes a “compromise” between maximizing the subjective welfare
V (.) and maximizing the“objective”welfare as represented by the term into brackets
[U(c∗(x˜(t)) − pc∗(x˜(t)) − ωxHc
∗(x˜(t))]. This last term is coined objective welfare
because it accounts for the observed level of animal suffering xH and is maximized for
beliefs t = 1. Hence by choosing t < 1 the agent incurs a welfare loss. In other words,
the cost of denying reality is the reduction in objective welfare associated with
a suboptimal consumption decision (i.e., too much meat consumption c∗(x˜(t)) ≥
c∗(xH)).
The parameter k ∈ [0, 1] is the weight given to the objective welfare. Note that
model (11) can also be rewritten as
max
t∈[0,1]
V (x˜(t))− kωc∗(x˜(t))(xH − xL)[1− t]. (12)
Hence, the choice of optimal beliefs may be viewed as a trade off between the subjec-
tive welfare V (x) and a cost of self-deception captured by the term kωc∗(x˜(t))(xH−
xL)[1− t]. This last term increases with the extent of self-deception 1− t. Note that
this term also increases with consumption c∗(x˜(t)) and the parameter k. Hence, the
1
parameter k can be interpreted as the (per consumption) unit cost of self-deception,
analogously to the model considered in the main text.
Differentiating (12) with respect to t we get
− (1− k)ωc∗(x˜(t))(xH − xL)− kω(c
∗)′(x˜(t))(xH − xL)
2[1− t]. (13)
Note that the first term is negative while the second term is positive under t < 1
given (c∗)′(.) ≤ 0. In particular, when k is large enough then the second term always
dominates, and the maximum must be t = 1. Conversely, when k is low enough then
the first term always dominates and the maximum must be t = 0. Moreover, when
an interior solution exists, then the optimal t increases in k since (13) increases in k.
As a result, we retrieve a similar characterization of optimal beliefs as in Proposition
1. Moreover, the relationship between optimal consumption and the unit cost of self
deception has also a similar form.12 In words, less meat consumption is associated
with more realism about animal suffering.
12Take for instance p = ω = xH = 1, xL = 0 and U(c) = log c. Then optimal beliefs are equal to
t = max(0, 2k−1) so that optimal consumption is equal to c∗(x˜(t)) = min(1, 1/(2k)) for k ∈ [0, 1].
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